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INTRODUCTION 
COME NOW Ilo Marie Grundberg and Janice Gray, plaintiffs and 
appellees, and timely file this Petition for Rehearing pursuant to 
Utah R.App.P.35. Appellees submit that in rendering the decision 
in this cause, the majority of this Court has overlooked or 
misapprehended certain points of law and fact which would require 
that the majority opinion be vacated and the minority opinion be 
made the judgment of this Court. To that end, plaintiffs 
respectfully file this petition for rehearing. 
A, The Court Has Overlooked The Inefficiency Of Or Misapprehended 
The Efficiency Of The FDA And Abdicated Judicial Functions To 
The Executive Branch 
This Court has issued an opinion reversing the public7s 
longstanding right to rely upon the judicial system for an 
impartial airing of its grievances. Rather than relying upon the 
crucible that the courtroom becomes in our adversarial system, 
injured individuals in Utah have now been deprived by this court-
made rule of the full benefit of strict products liability 
protection when prescribed any drug product,1 particularly when 
those individual rights were already subjected to the court-made 
learned intermediary doctrine. In dissent, Justice Stewart 
observed that the Supreme Court of Utah had "little basis for 
abdicating judicial responsibility to the FDA." Grundberg, Slip 
Op. at p.19 (Stewart, J., dissenting).2 Plaintiffs urge this Court 
^ This Court held that H[p]laintiffs may still recover under a 
strict liability claim by demonstrating that the product was 
unreasonably dangerous due to an inadequate warning, a 
manufacturing flaw, mismarketing, or misrepresenting information to 
the FDA.,f Grundberg, Slip Op. at p.24 n.8 (erroneously labeled 
footnote 7). 
2
 In submitting their first brief, plaintiffs adhered to Utah 
R.App.P.41 and kept within the Record certified by this Court. 
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to reconsider the wisdom of such abdication in light of the 
following discussion of the FDA's efficiency and integrity. 
Congressional investigations time and again have demonstrated 
that the FDA has repeatedly approved drugs — many of which 
eventually were withdrawn from the market for reasons of public 
safety — in complete ignorance of critical information either in 
its own files or in the published medical literature, or both, 
relating to the hazards of such drugs. For example, the FDA 
approved Oraflex on April 19, 1982, for the treatment of arthritis. 
Eli Lilly withdrew the drug from the market on August 4, 1982, in 
the wake of 11 reported deaths associated with the drug's use in 
the United States and 61 reported deaths in the United Kingdom. Of 
principal concern were reports of serious and sometimes fatal 
Oraflex-associated liver and kidney disease. In a report entitled, 
Deficiencies in FDA's Regulation of the New Drug "Oraflex", the 
House Committee on Government Operations, ("H.C.G.O.") a principal 
Congressional committee overseeing the FDA, found that in approving 
Oraf lex for marketing, the FDA was unaware that it had received in 
the Oraflex clinical trials four reports of serious concomitant 
liver and kidney disease and two serious reports of kidney disease 
unaccompanied by liver injury. At the time the FDA approved 
Defendant Upjohn ignored that Rule and submitted a voluminous 
Appendix. As part of this Petition for Rehearing, plaintiffs 
submit certain exhibits by an Appendix supporting their positions 
and to rebut the one-sided picture shown through Upjohn's Appendix. 
3
 See Deficiencies in FDA's Regulation of the New Drug "Oraflex". 
Fourteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations, 
H.Rep.98-511, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983),, pages 9 and 10. 
Appendix, Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A". As a consequence of its 
ignorance, the agency approved untruthful and misleading labeling 
that confined Oraflex-associated liver reactions to "liver function 
test abnormalities" which were "usually transient" and that denied 
altogether the existence of "evidence . . . of renal [kidney] 
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Oraflex for marketing, and for several months thereafter, it was 
unaware of the number of reports of Oraflex-associated deaths it 
had received prior to its approval of the drug.4 Prior to 
approving Oraflex, the FDA made no effort to obtain information on 
its safety from foreign countries in which it was already marketed 
and was, therefore, unaware of a large number of reports of serious 
and sometimes fatal reactions to the drug submitted to British and 
Danish regulatory authorities.5 The FDA placed the public's health 
at risk by failing to enforce the legal requirement that drug 
manufacturers report all adverse reactions to a new drug under 
clinical investigation, information essential to weigh the risks 
against its potential benefits.6 
The FDA approved Merital for the treatment of depression on 
December 31, 1984. Merital was withdrawn from the market in 
January of 1986 because of a large number of reports of serious 
immune-allergic or hypersensitivity reactions, including several 
fatalities, associated with its use. In a report entitled, FDA's 
Regulation of the New Drug Merital. the H.C.G.O. found that prior 
to approving Merital, the FDA overlooked clinical evidence it had 
received of the drug's allergy-inducing potential.7 The FDA also 
failed to ensure receipt and review of important information 
pertinent to the safety of Merital.8 The FDA's enforcement of its 
toxicity in [the Oraflex] clinical studies.11 Id. at pp.9-10. 
* Id. at pages 11-12. 
H Id. at page 13. 
* Id. at page 22. 
7
 See FDA's Regulation of the New Drug Merital. Fifteenth Report 
by the Committee on Government Operations, H.Rep. 100-206, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess.(1987), page 24. Appendix, Exhibit "B". 
8
 Id. at page 37. This deficiency included: a. important 
articles in the published world literature relevant to the drug's 
safety; and b. labeling, "Dear Doctor11 letters, and other 
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adverse reaction reporting requirements was inadequate. H.C.G.O. 
concluded that the FDA exposed the American public to the potential 
hazards of Merital without requiring that the drug's efficacy be 
supported by substantial evidence derived from adequate and well-
controlled studies, as mandated by law. ° 
The FDA approved Versed preoperative sedation, induction of 
general anesthesia and conscious sedation for short diagnostic or 
endoscopic procedures on December 20, 1985. Thereafter, Versed was 
associated with numerous reports of life-threatening and, in many 
instances, fatal episodes of cardiac and respiratory arrest, 
particularly when used for conscious sedation. The FDA concluded 
that these reactions were dose-related, but not until November of 
1987, were the recommended conscious sedation doses for Versed 
substantially reduced. In a report entitled FDA's Deficient 
Regulation of the New Drug Versed, the H.C.G.O., concluding that 
the Versed doses originally approved for conscious sedation were 
excessive,11 found that the recommended doses to which Versed had 
been reduced were identical to those reported to be effective and 
sufficient in several studies. When it approved Versed for 
marketing, the FDA was unaware of these important studies, 
notwithstanding that they had been prominently published in the 
important regulatory information related to new drugs being 
marketed outside the United States that are under FDA review. Id. 
at pp. 37, 42. 
9
 Id. at page 71. In particular, the FDA overlooked clear 
evidence that Merital's manufacturer failed to submit Merital-
associated safety information, as required by law. Id. 
1 0
 Id. at p.80. 
1 1
 See Deficiencies in FDA/s Regulation of the New Drug Versed. 
Seventy-First Report by the Committee on Government Operations, 
H.Rep.100-1086, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988), p.10. Appendix, 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit "C". 
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medical literature12 and, in many instances, had been submitted to 
the agency and were, thereforef retrievable from the agency's 
files.13 H.C.G.O. also found that the FDA was not aware of the 
manner in which Versed was regulated in foreign nations.14 The 
FDA's enforcement of its reporting requirements continued to be 
grossly deficient. Most notably, the FDA failed to investigate the 
adverse reaction reporting practices of the manufacturer of Versed, 
notwithstanding data the agency had received from the company 
strongly suggesting that the firm had neglected to submit to the 
agency reports of Versed-associated deaths known to it prior to the 
drug's approval.15 
The FDA approved Zomax on October 29, 1980, for the relief of 
mild to moderately severe pain. On March 4, 1983, marketing of the 
drug was halted by its manufacturer due to a very large number of 
allergic/anaphylactoid reactions associated with its use. 
Eventuallyf more than 2f100 such reactions were reported to the 
FDA. In a report entitled, FDA's Regulation of Zomax.16 the 
H.C.G.O. found that the FDA approved Zomax in violation of an 
agency policy requiring that its benefits be shown to outweigh its 
demonstrated carcinogenic risk.17 Again, FDA failed to make the 
1:2
 Id. at page 20. 
\ \ Id. at page 21. 
1 4
 Specifically, the agency did not know that: (a) Versed had been 
labeled for use abroad at substantially lower conscious sedation 
doses than had been approved in the United States; and (b) actions 
had been taken by foreign regulatory agencies to reduce the 
solution concentration of Versed and thereby minimize the risk of 
overdosing patients on Versed. Id. at page 25. 
\ Id. at page 37. 
1 6
 See FDA's Regulation of Zomax, Thirty-First Report by the 
Committee on Government Operations, H.Rep.No. 98-584, 98th Cong., 
1st Sess.(1983). Appendix, Plaintiffs' Exhibit lfDM. 
17
 Id. at page 5. 
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risk/benefit analysis this Court has placed within the exclusive 
province of the FDA. Also, the FDA's monitoring of Zomax-
associated adverse reaction reports was deficient. When Zomax was 
removed from the market, the agency's computerized tracking system 
showed that the FDA had only received 270 reports of Zomax-
associated allergic/anaphylactoid reactions, whereas the drug's 
manufacturer had actually submitted 900 to the agency.18 The FDA 
also failed to note evidence in its possession suggesting that 
Zomax posed a higher risk of serious and sometimes life-threatening 
allergic/anaphylactoid reactions than other drugs in its class, 
particularly among patients with no prior history of allergy to 
Zomax or any other drug.19 
The FDA is neither infallible, self-informed nor omniscient. 
That agency, like others, depends upon the industry which it 
regulates, and it seldom knows that which is not highlighted in the 
submissions made to it. This Court should consider carefully 
before sanctioning the FDA as the ultimate authority speaking to 
the safety of prescription drugs.20 
Numerous articles have discussed the task of the new 
Commissioner of the FDA in light of the decreasing efficiency, 
declining morale and eroding credibility of the FDA with both 
Congress and consumers. In an article published at or about the 
time of Dr. David Kessler's appointment as Commissioner, the 
Washington Post reported that: 
1 3
 Id. at pages 11-12. 
19
 Id. at page 16. 
2 0
 Halcion received final approval for marketing on November 15, 
1982,a date closely aligned with the approval problems related 
above. 
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The agency's credibility was damaged last year when four 
FDA officials were caught accepting bribes to speed up 
the approval of certain generic drugs.... Several of the 
largest companies were caught sending the agency 
fraudulent information about their drugs.... Inspections 
of products and food and drug manufacturing plants 
decreased from 36,528 in 1980 to 18,592 in 1989. 
Seizures of contaminated foods or adulterated 
pharmaceuticals dropped from 539 in 1980 to 142 in 
1989.... Kessler says one of his first priorities is 
restoring credibility to the generic drug division. "We 
have to be sure that the agency is clean and that 
everyone who deals with it is clean/1 said Kessler.... 
Thompson, L., Finally, A New Chief For the FDA. The Washington 
Post, Nov. 20, 1990, included in the Appendix as Exhibit "Elf. The 
Associated Press reported: 
The Food and Drug Administration, its reputation 
tarnished by the generic drug scandal, is trying to 
restore its credibility by strengthening enforcement 
across the range of its authority, the agency's new chief 
[Dr. David Kessler] said Wednesday. >There has to be a 
sense out there that there is a will to carry out the 
statute,' .... * Ensuring the accuracy of the data 
presented to this agency is a high priority,' said 
Kessler.... After uncovering fraud, bribery and 
corruption in the generic drug industry and the FDA's 
generic drug division, the agency changed the drug-
approval process for these products. *The honor system 
is out the window,' Kessler said. FDA inspectors now 
audit the information in companies' drug-approval 
applications to verify that the data is correct.... 
Previously, the agency relied on companies to be 
truthful. But the scandal uncovered numerous instances 
in which companies cheated on safety and effectiveness 
tests required for FDA approval. Dozens of drugs were 
taken off the market as a result.... 
The Associated Press, Feb. 27, 1991, Appendix, Exhibit "F". 
In these and in the numerous other articles which have been 
published in recent months,21 the relative ineffectiveness of the 
FDA has been noted. The articles recognize that the problems at 
the FDA are pervasive. H*It is glaringly apparent that the FDA 
21 Included within the Appendix as cumulative Exhibit H6H is a 
collection of articles discussing the condition of the FDA and the 
impact of Dr. Kessler's appointment and confirmation thereon. 
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cannot now execute all of its statutory responsibilities within the 
limitations of existing resources.' said [an advisory panel in a 
draft report] prepared by 15 experts chosen by the agency." 
Newsday, April 12, 1991, included in the Appendix as Exhibit "H". 
"A Federal Advisory Committee appointed to study the Food and Drug 
Administration says the agency is overwhelmed and incapable of 
coping with vastly increased duties caused by the AIDS epidemic, a 
flood of food imports and advances in medical science and 
technology." N.Y.Times, April 11, 1991, included in the Appendix 
as Exhibit "I". "In a draft of its final report, the panel of 15 
experts says that F.D.A. laboratories and equipment are in abysmal 
condition, that some food factories are inspected only once every 
eight years and that the agency no longer has adequate scientific 
ability to evaluate new drugs, much less keep up with 
*revolutionary advances occurring in the biological and medical 
sciences./H Id. 
These articles reflect the consensus among Congressional 
leaders and scientists that the FDA has not fulfilled its 
mission.22 To eliminate the judicial arena as one forum wherein is 
considered a prescription drug product's safety and efficacy and to 
rely entirely upon the FDA for the resolution of such concerns is 
to place the well-being of the public into the bureaucratic hands 
of a federal agency all too subject to the vagaries of politics and 
7 2
 See also the General Accounting Office's Report to the 
Chairman, Subcommittee On Human Resources and Intergovernmental 
Relations, Committee On Government Operations. House of 
Representatives: FDA Drug Review-Post-approval Risks 1976-85, page 
57, included in the Appendix as Exhibit "J". (51.5% or 102 of 198 
drugs analyzed have serious post-approval risks requiring labelling 
changes or withdrawal from the market.) 
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personalities. Plaintiffs urge this Court to reconsider its 
decision establishing the FDA as the forum of last resort for the 
citizens of Utah. 
B. The Court Overlooked Or Misapprehended The Impact of The 
Court's Opinion Discouraging Safer And More Efficacious Drugs. 
This Court identified several policy reasons as supporting its 
decision to afford protection from a strict product liability claim 
to all prescription drugs. In dissent, Justice Stewart addressed 
those policy reasons and identified competing policies militating 
against such protection. Plaintiffs submit that Justice Stewart 
has provided powerful reasons not to grant prescription drugs the 
unwarranted protection approved by the majority. 
In addition, this Court's opinion overlooks the powerful 
motivation such protection fosters in manufacturers to achieve the 
approval, at whatever costs to scientific integrity, of the FDA. 
While such protection might drive some manufacturers to present 
their data in a more forthright manner, it is equally likely that 
many manufacturers will conduct themselves in the manner alleged by 
plaintiffs in the pending products liability case against Upjohn. 
That is, seeing the protection to be obtained through FDA approval, 
many manufacturers may misrepresent in the voluminous submissions 
to the FDA the scientific truth about the safety and efficacy of a 
particular drug. 
Few plaintiffs have either the technical expertise or the 
extensive resources necessary to evaluate the truthfulness of a 
drug manufacturer's submissions to the FDA. As the reports and 
articles discussed above indicate, even the FDA has been unable to 
examine for comparison purposes the accuracy and completeness of 
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the summaries and technical reports submitted to it by a drug 
manufacturer with the underlying clinical trials data. The very 
breadth of the protection afforded to drug manufacturers by the 
Supreme Court of Utah will encourage deception at the approval 
stage• 
Moreover, granting drug manufacturers even limited protection 
from strict liability for all drugs upon approval by the FDA 
creates a disincentive to engage in research and development toward 
making that particular drug, or a derivative thereof, safer and 
more efficacious. Once approval has been obtained a drug 
manufacturer has little incentive to fulfill its duty to remain 
abreast of scientific developments. See Barson v. E.R.Squibb & 
Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1984). M[P]ublic policy 
militates against finding as a matter of law that FDA approval of a 
particular drug relieves a pharmaceutical company of further 
responsibility to continue research and testing to develop safer 
products." MacGillivray v. Lederle Laboratories, 667 F.Supp. 743, 
745 (D.N.M. .1987) . The court in MacGillivray recognized that "a 
tort judgment against a drug manufacturer may in fact accelerate 
development of better, safer products .... Id. 
The protection afforded to drug manufacturers by this Court 
will encourage scientific stagnation rather than promote public 
safety.23 Pharmaceutical manufacturers now will rest on the FDA's 
approval and use it as a broad shield against liability while at 
the same time recognizing it as a disincentive to further reporting 
73
 See Page! Generic Product Risks; The Case Against Comment K 
And For Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 853 (1983), as well 
as Wagner, Strict Liability Isn't A Problem - It's A Solution, 
Vol.19: 1, 13(1989). Appendix, Plaintiffs' Exhibit K. 
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research and development. 4 In light of these policies, plaintiffs 
urge this court to reconsider its decision. 
C. The Court Has Overlooked Or Misapprehended The Traditional 
Focus of Strict Liability Upon The Product Rather Than 
Conduct. 
Indeed, the approach adopted by this Court dramatically 
undermines the very core of the doctrine of strict liability by 
focusing upon the conduct of both the manufacturer and the FDA 
rather than upon the product itself. 
In strict liability, the plaintiff is not required to 
impugn the conduct of the maker or other sellers[,] but 
he is required to impugn the product. Under section 
402A, it is said that the product must be in a *defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous.' This simply means 
that the product must be defective in the kind of way 
that subjects persons or tangible property to an 
unreasonable risk of harm. 
Prosser And Keeton On Torts (5th Ed.1984), §99 at p.695.25 This 
Court so held in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co. . 601 P.2d 
152, 158 (Utah 1979), recognizing that a manufacturer is strictly 
liable even where "the [manufacturer] has exercised all possible 
24 Plaintiffs submit that this decision is inconsistent with 
current Utah law as contained in the open courts and remedies 
provisions of the Utah Constitution at Article I, §11- See also 
Berry By and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985). Therein, this Court recognized the propensity of defects in 
drug products and injuries caused thereby to appear many years 
after the initial marketing or use of such products. Id. at 674. 
2 5
 The rule as contained in Section 402A "renders the maker of a 
product strictly liable to consumers or users for harm caused to 
them in the course of a foreseeable use of the product by its 
unreasonably dangerous conditions or qualities, without respect to 
fault ....H Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts Vol 5, §28.15 
at p.445-45 (2d.Ed.1986) (emphasis added). MIn strict liability, 
the central issue is the character of the product, not the conduct 
of the parties." Lee and Lindahl, Modern Tort Law, Vol.2, §27.02 
at p.546-47 (Rev.Ed.) (footnote omitted). See also Greenman v. 
Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) (the purpose 
of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting 
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put 
such products on the market rather than by the persons who are 
powerless to protect themselves). 
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care in the preparation and sale of his product ....w 
With its opinion, this Court has eroded the full protection of 
strict liability and placed burdens not envisaged by that law upon 
persons injured by the product, rather than upon the manufacturer 
of the product most able to bear such burdens and which chose to 
place its products on the markets for profit. It is a dangerous 
principle for any court to determine as a matter of law that the 
executive branch of government, or a regulatory agency thereof, 
fulfills the duties the law imposes upon that branch merely by 
virtue of the nature of the duties, relegated to it by the 
legislative branch. Yet that is what this Court has done and 
not in the area of state law, but of all things, in the area of 
federal law. 
This Court's decision disregards the traditional focus of 
strict products liability law and returns emphasis to the conduct 
of the parties. In a strict products liability case in Utah 
involving prescription drug products, the emphasis will no longer 
be upon the defective or dangerous character of the drug but upon 
the conduct of the manufacturer and the approval process of the 
FDA. Underfunded plaintiffs who fail to carry such burdens will 
suffer the often devastating lifelong effects of using a defective 
product. Plaintiffs urge this Court to return the focus to that 
which has caused the harm - the product. 
D. The Court Has Overlooked Or Misapprehended The Impact Of This 
Decision On The Learned Intermediary Doctrine And The Medical 
Profession. 
In rendering its opinion, while recognizing the viability of 
the learned intermediary doctrine in Utah, this Court overlooked 
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the effect of such decision upon that doctrine, which already 
serves as an impediment to an individual's action to recover for 
injuries sustained pursuant to his or her use of a prescription 
drug product. The doctrine provides that Mif a manufacturer knows 
or should know of a risk associated with its product, it is 
directly liable to the patient if it fails to adequately warn the 
medical profession of that danger." Grundberg, Slip Op. at p.l4# 
citing Barson, 682 P.2d at 835. In Barson. this Court stated: 
The manufacturer of ethical drugs has the duty of making 
timely and adequate warnings to the medical profession of 
any dangerous side effects produced by its drugs of which 
it knows or has reason to know. The manufacturer is 
directly liable to the patient for the breach of such 
duty. 
Barson, 682 P.2d at 835 (footnotes omitted). 
With the instant decision, this Court has held that every 
physician who prescribes any prescription drug to his or her 
patient has by definition prescribed for that patient's use an 
••unavoidably unsafe" product. In any action brought against such 
physician, the plaintiffs therein would be entitled to an 
instruction to the jury that the drug or other prescription product 
at issue is, as a matter of law, "unavoidably unsafe". Whether 
such conduct in any given situation violates the standard of care 
will be a question for the jury. That the jury has been informed 
that the physician-defendant prescribed an "unavoidably unsafe" 
product is a species of evidence likely to sway a jury. 
One result of this Court's decision to afford prescription 
drug manufacturers protection from strict products liability, then, 
is a possible diversion of liability for injuries suffered pursuant 
to the use of prescription drugs from the manufacturer of such 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
drugs to the prescribing physician. Physicians will be placed in 
the awkward position, one which undermines the confidence critical 
to a meaningful doctor-patient relationship, of informing their 
patients that the drug product being prescribed is "unavoidably 
unsafe", no matter how insignificant or how serious the illness, 
disease or injury confronted by the patient, and no matter how 
dangerous or how mild the medication prescribed. Patients will 
then face the difficult and paradoxical decision of whether to 
consent to such treatment in light of this knowledge. This 
alteration in Utah law presents the possibility of a physician 
deciding against use of prescription drugs because of his potential 
exposure to this shifted liability, a result which furthers neither 
the treatment of the patient nor the development and promotion of 
new drug products, results which are contrary to the policies 
sought to be furthered by the majority's decision. 
Plaintiffs submit that this Court has overlooked the impact 
its decision would have upon the learned intermediary doctrine in 
Utah and upon the medical profession. Plaintiffs urge this Court 
to reconsider its opinion in light of this potentially explosive 
situation. 
Counsel for petitioners certify that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs and their counsel recognize the significant issues 
this Court faced in its deliberations in receiving and deciding 
this case of first impression. While plaintiffs1 views of the 
legal issues and the justice of their cause are reflected in the 
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courageous dissents, their appreciation and respect extend to all 
the Court, and they are confident that this Petition for Rehearing 
will receive this Court's continued careful consideration. 
In light of the gravity of this case, the issues involved and 
the severe ramifications of the Court's opinion upon Utah citizens 
suffering drug related injuries and deaths, plaintiffs respectfully 
request that this Court grant plaintiffs' petition for rehearing. 
Only life-threatening conditions, injuries and diseases for 
which a safer therapeutic alternative is not available warrant the 
prescription of unavoidably unsafe drugs. As its past record 
indicated, the FDA, upon which the majority heavily relies, is 
neither an effective nor an omnipotent policing, regulatory agency 
inasmuch as it lacks both the resources and the expertise to do so. 
Public policy dictates that courts should not engage in legislation 
in violation of the separation of powers provision of the 
Constitution, for if Congress had such faith in the FDA, it should 
pass the federal legislation needed to equal in scope this Court's 
present decision. 
Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray that a rehearing be granted in this 
case, that the majority decision as rendered by this Court be 
vacated, and that the present minority opinion of this Court be 
made the unanimous judgment of this Court. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respectfully submitted, 
720 Broadway 
Post Office Box 2128 
Columbus, Georgia 31902 
(404) 324-0050 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 533-9800 
POPE, McGLAMRY, 




C. Neal Pope S 
Pro Hac Vice 
Steven W. Saccoccia 
Pro Hac Vice 
WORKMAN, NYDEGGER & JENSEN 
By: Z^fort^ 
H. Ross Workman 
Utah State Bar No.A3556 
Thomas R. Vuksinick 
Utah State Bar No.A3341 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS 
» 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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counsel for defendant by delivering four copies to appellant's 
counsel of record to: 
Thomas L. Kay, Esq. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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